We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters' preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus government forms and the policy maximizing the sum of utilities of the members of the government is implemented. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D72.
Introduction
A central issue in the political economy literature is understanding how voters influence the policy outcome in a democracy. Voters select their political representatives through the electoral rule and politicians, in turn, choose the policy outcome. When elections are held under plurality rule, the system implements the policy preferred by the winner. As rational voters anticipate this, the theoretical and empirical literature has typically assumed that voters are instrumentally motivated in such a context (Cox, 1997) . In the proportional representation case, however, voting incentives are more complicated. This seems to be the main reason behind the dearth of models that assume strategic voting under proportional representation. However, Cox (1997) also identifies the strategic incentives that voters face under proportional representation systems. More recently, Abramson et al. (2010) and Hobolt and Karp (2010) show that the amount of strategic voting under plurality and proportional system are quite similar.
But there is an additional layer of complexity. Typical modern democracies are characterized by a legislative body, elected by proportional rule, and by an executive body, which derives its mandate from the legislature. The theoretical literature on legislative bargaining under proportional representation starts from Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) where a quite complex three-party model is analyzed leading to a plethora of equilibria. The existence of a multiplicity of government structures that arise in equilibrium is a common characteristic of these models. This can be seen also in Baron and Diermeier (2001) who put forward a protocol of legislative bargaining in a three-party system and show how the government coalition and the policy outcome may depend on who is selected as government formateur.
Thus, policy oriented voters have to anticipate how their vote affects the final policy outcome in such a complex institutional setup. There seems to be evidence that this is indeed the case. Bargsted and Kedar (2009) We introduce a tractable proportional representation model that incorporates all of these main features. Voters vote taking into account which government will eventually form and which will be the policy implemented by such a government. For the voting stage, we build on De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni (2007). The authors study strategic voting under proportional rule and find that, essentially, only a two-party equilibrium exists, in which rational voters vote only for the two extreme parties. However, we departure from their model by allowing for uncertainty over the voters' preferences, thus, enriching the model in a more realistic manner. For the government formation process and final policy choice, we draw on Baron and Diermeier (2001) who study a three party proportional model with a post-electoral bargaining stage. A randomly selected formateur chooses a potential government coalition and makes its members a take-it-or-leave-it offer over both the policy outcome and the allocation of transfers. In equilibrium, the policy choice corresponds to the policy that maximizes the sum of utilities of the government members. The main difference in this stage of our model with Baron and Diermeier (2001) is that legislators' preferences allow us to work with an arbitrary number of parties.
We obtain the following results. Most strategic voters vote only for two extreme parties at either side of the political spectrum. This is the most efficient manner in which a voter moves the final policy outcome towards her preferred policy as she anticipate that the final policy will be the average of the elected legislators' ideal points. Thus, the composition of the parliament is dominated by members of these two extreme parties, nonetheless, any selected formateur selects a government coalition consisting of every member of the parliament, that is, a consensus government arises. The implemented policy is the one that maximizes the sum of utilities of the members of the government. 
The Model
We consider a political environment with policy space X = [0, 1] and status quo q ∈ X.
The set of parties is P ≡ {1, . . . , k, . . . , p}. Each party k ∈ P has a commonly 
Voters select the composition of the parliament through a proportional electoral system. Hence, we let S i = {1, ..., k, ..., p} be the set of ballots available to voter i. Ballot s i = k is a vector of p components with all zeros except for a one in the k-th position representing the vote for party k. Given a ballot profile s = (s 1 , ..., s n ), the share of votes accrued by party k is equal
. Correspondingly, if the ballot profile is s, the share of seats that party k has in the parliament is also equal to µ 
A legislator may or may not belong to the government. If a legislator is not part of the government she only cares about the implemented policy and, therefore, her final utility is represented by (1) . If a legislator belongs to the government then she also cares about office-holding benefits B ∈ R and transfers y l ∈ R. We assume that both office-holding benefits and transfers enter linearly in the utility function of the legislator. Therefore, if policy x ∈ [0, 1] is implemented, the utility to a legislator l that belongs to the government and receives transfers y l ∈ R is equal to
We furthermore assume that legislators are sufficiently office motivated. In particular, if we eliminate transfers, every legislator should prefer belonging to the government to the implementation of the status quo q ∈ [0, 1]. Given preferences over policies in (1) , this is guaranteed whenever B > 1. 
contains the probability that voter i votes for each party when her ideal policy is θ i .
As mentioned above, the structure of the parliament is decided under proportional rule so, given a ballot profile s, each party k's proportion of seats in the parliament M s = {1, . . . , m s } is equal to its vote share µ s k
. In the second stage both the composition of the government and the policy are decided.
We solve this stage by relying on the bargaining protocol proposed in Baron and Diermeier (2001) . Every legislator l ∈ M s has the same probability to be selected as the formateur (we think of her as the selected prime minister).
Under this bargaining protocol, the formateur, to be denoted as f , selects a coalition G ⊂ M s such that f ∈ G and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer both in policy and transfers dimensions. In case the coalition does not have a majority of seats in the parliament or at least one of the members of the coalition does not accept the take-it-or-leave-it offer then the government does not form.
In the third stage policy and transfers are implemented. If the formation of government G was successful then policy x G is implemented and transfers are made according to the vector y G . If the government formation process was unsuccessful then the status quo q is implemented and no transfers are made. We now solve the game backward, starting from the analysis of the selection of policy outcome and transfers.
Selection of policy outcome and transfers
The third stage of the model consist of the implementation of the policy out- Nature selects the formateur. The probability that each party has one of its member selected as the formateur is equal to its vote share. The formateur selects the government G, the policy x G , and a vector of transfers y G . We compute what the optimal policy and transfer vector are that maximize the formateur's utility for a given coalition G. That is,
s.t.
Inequalities in (3) are the participation constraints for legislators in G \ { f }
and (4) is the budget balance constraint. Since the utility of the formateur is increasing in y f , it is easy to show that the inequalities in (3) and (4) must be binding. Combine the resulting equalities in (3) and (4) to solve for y f and substitute the resulting expression in (2). We find that the optimal policy x G must be the utilitarian solution:
that is,
Thus, the vector of transfers y G is given by:
Under this policy choice and transfers, the utility of each member of the coalition l ∈ G \ { f } other than the formateur is
Whereas the utility to the formateur is
We see that the bargaining power is in the formateur's hands who extracts all the rent associated to x G . As a consequence,
The Government Coalition Selection
We now focus on the structure of the optimal coalition. We prove that the optimal size of the coalition always leads to consensus governments, that is governments that include every member of the parliament.
Proposition 1
Given that for each possible coalition G the formateur proposes the policy x G and transfers y G , in equilibrium, the government is composed of every legislator in the parliament.
Proof. Suppose that there is a legislator j ∉ G, we prove that
Using the utility to the formateur computed in the previous section, we rewrite this expression as
Given that x G∪{ j} is the policy outcome that maximizes the sum of utilities of legislators in G ∪ { j}, the left hand side of (6) satisfies
where the last inequality follows from the shape of the utility function. On the other hand, the right hand side of (6) satisfies
establishing the desired result.
The proof of the previous proposition makes evident that the assumption that legislators are sufficiently office motivated, that is B > 1, can be dispensed with if we assume that, for every legislator j, the status quo is at least as bad an outcome for her as her least preferred policy. 
Strategic Voting
Recall that a ballot profile s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) induces the vector of vote shares
A type profile θ, together with a strategy profile σ, induces a probability distribution over ballot profiles that results in the expected vector
We also define the vector of vote shares that is obtained if we remove player i, that is,
. Given a strategy profile σ we compute the expected vector of vote shares µ σ by taking the expectation over type profiles
It is also convenient to define player i's
Given a vector of vote shares µ ∈ ∆(P), the outcome that would result form the bargaining stage analyzed in the previous section is
The next proposition states that, apart from a small fraction of the electorate, policy-oriented voters vote only for the two most extreme parties whose bliss points are at either side of the policy space. Furthermore, the complement of this set of voters becomes negligible as size of the electorate n grows to infinity. Let L be the leftmost party and let R be the rightmost party, that is, L ≡ arg min k∈P ζ k , and R ≡ arg max k∈P ζ k .
Proposition 2
Let σ the be a voting strategy profile used in an equilibrium of the model. For every voter i,
Proof. With abuse of notation, for every party k, we let k denote both the pure action of some player i that votes for party k and the constant strategy that prescribes voting for party k for every realization of θ i .
n then voter i's unique best reply is to vote for party L, that is
Using the quadratic form of the utility function we rewrite the previous inequality as:
Expanding the previous expression, taking expectation with respect to other players' behavior, and using the properties of the variance of a random variable, we obtain
which simplifies to
Expanding again the previous expression and taking the expectation with respect to the distribution of voters' preferences, we get
which, similarly as above, simplifies to
Rewrite this inequality as
The first part of the last inequality is positive, i.e. X (µ
cause L is the leftmost party. In order to prove our statement it is enough to
(β) A similar argument applies.
We conclude this section showing that the equilibrium outcome of the model is basically unique. In order to do so, letF be the correspondence whose graph is the closure of the graph of the distribution function F. Furthermore, define the correspondence G so that, for each θ ∈ [0, 1], the set G(θ) is the convex hull ofF(θ). (Note that G is the correspondence x → {F(x)} when the distribution function F does not have any mass point.) Let θ * ∈ [0, 1] be the
Proposition 3
If σ is a voting strategy profile used in an equilibrium of the
Proof. Aiming for a contradiction, suppose
because, under σ, party R receives an expected share of votes of at least
). This provides the desired contradiction, hence
Examples
We now introduce three examples that illustrate the main results of the pa- 
Solving the game backward we know that that a consensus government arises and that the implemented policy is the average of the bliss points of the members of the coalition. The optimal behavior of a voter with type θ i = 0.5 depends on the likelihood of other voters' types and on their strategies. We show that in this case it is optimal for a voter with type θ i = 0.5 to vote for party R for any possible strategy profile such that type 0 voters vote for L and type 1 voters vote for R.
Consider a voter with θ i = 0.5 and the strategy profileσ −i where for every
where centrist voters vote for parties L, C, and R with respective probabil- where c + r ≤ 1. Clearly, X (µσ −i ,R ) is maximum when r = 1. Hence consider the strategy profile σ * −i where for every j = i
The expected implemented policy X (µ
Therefore, the equilibrium strategy is σ * (θ) where for any i = 1, . . . , n, In this example, Proposition 3 implies that the expected policy as n grows to infinity is the policy θ * that solves: -if a voter with bliss pointθ prefers L to C (R to C) then he also prefers L to
-if a voter with bliss pointθ prefers L to C (R to C) then every voter i with bliss point θ i <θ (θ i >θ) prefers L to both C and R (R to both C and L).
For a given strategy profile of the other players, given that the utility function is quadratic, a voter with bliss point θ i prefers L to C (and R) if:
Similarly, a voter with bliss point θ i prefers R to C (and L) if
Let θ be the bliss point of the voter who is indifferent between L and C.
Similarly, let θ be the bliss point of the voter who is indifferent between C and R. The voter's optimal strategy is
We can therefore write the policy outcomes as follows: Note that as n goes to infinity both thresholds converge to . Such a fraction is small even in small elections. For example, it is 5% for n = 6, and 1% for n = 30. If one considers an election with n = 1000, as the election of a small town council, the fraction of voters with moderate behavior is 0, 03%. As before, voters with bliss point θ i = 0 vote for party L and voters with bliss point θ i ∈ ( 3 5 , 1) vote for party R. Let θ be the bliss point of a voter who is indifferent between L and C, and let θ be the bliss point of a voter who is indifferent between C and R. As in Example 2, any voter i's optimal strategy
We can therefore rewrite the policy outcomes as follows, taking into account
